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Previous studies have reported a connection between creativity and dishonesty 
(Beaussart, Andrews, & Kaufman, 2013; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 
2014). This study attempts to investigate these finding further, and empirically connect 
the number of justifications provided or produced for a dishonest behavior to the 
perceived acceptability of the behavior. 203 participants were given two tasks involving 
evaluating and justifying dishonest behavior. Those who scored high on the Creative 
Behavior Inventory were able to produce significantly more justifications overall, but not 
those who scored high on the Creative Personality Scale. The total number of 
justifications produced was correlated with the average perceived acceptability of 
dishonest behavior. However, when justifications were provided, they were not 
significantly correlated with the perceived acceptability of the dishonest behavior. 
Finally, this study was unable to find any significant connection between creativity and 
perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior, contrary to previous studies. Implications, 
limitations, and future directions are discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PURPOSE 
Statement of the Problem 
To many in Western culture, creativity is seen as a positive trait to be fostered and 
nurtured. Successful companies strive to find innovative thinkers and creative 
personalities to help gain an edge against the competition (Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 
2004). School children are taught that George Washington’s creative use of his small 
militia led to the success of the Revolutionary War. In academia, the ability to create and 
synthesize new information from old is considered the highest level (and ultimate goal) 
of critical thinking skills (Krathwohl, 2002). Despite creativity’s value and positive 
qualities, negatives also exist. True to the saying that “there are two sides to every coin,” 
creativity does indeed have a dark side. 
The dark side of creativity includes evidence that some creative people may be 
more likely to be dishonest. In a series of studies, Gino and Ariely (2012), found that 
scores on creative personality measures and dishonesty are positively correlated. They 
also found that being primed to think creatively increases the likelihood of engaging in 
dishonest behavior. When given opportunities to justify dishonest behavior, both creative 
and non-creative groups behaved equally dishonestly, but when opportunities to justify 
behaviors were low, creative people were more dishonest than non-creative people (Gino 
& Ariely, 2012). Beaussart et al. (2013) supported this connection between creativity and 
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dishonesty with a study of their own, reporting that people who scored high on creativity 
measures were more likely to cheat by taking extra credit that they had not earned. 
The relationship between creativity and dishonesty also seems to be a two-way 
street. Not only were people more likely to behave dishonestly when they were primed to 
think creatively, (Gino & Ariely, 2012), but people who behaved dishonestly in another 
study (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014) were subsequently more creative, even after accounting 
for creative differences. If dishonesty and creativity were cousins, their common relative 
would appear to be divergence, or rule-breaking, as participants who engaged in 
dishonest and creative tasks described feelings of being unconstrained by rules (Gino & 
Wiltermuth, 2014). 
Gino and Ariely (2012) explain that their findings are evidence that creativity may 
increase a person’s ability to generate reasons to justify their behavior, thus promoting 
dishonesty. Specifically, they put participants in a position in which they were able to lie 
in order to earn more money from the study. They were randomly placed into conditions 
that either allowed for or limited opportunities to create justifications for lying. It was 
found that the group with more opportunities to justify lying was more likely to lie. 
Additionally, some creative people were more likely to lie than non-creative people when 
there were fewer opportunities to justify the behavior, but that difference was not found 
in the condition allowing for more justifications. Their conclusion from these findings is 
that “creativity promotes dishonesty by increasing individuals’ ability to generate reasons 
to justify their dishonest behavior” (Gino & Ariely, 2012, pp. 22). 
However, the participants were not specifically asked if they made any 
justifications at all, nor were the number of justifications made tallied. Additionally, it 
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was not measured if justifications themselves are what promote dishonesty. So, while we 
can reasonably infer that more justifications were made and that more justifications 
promote dishonesty, this current study was designed to further clarify these findings. It 
looks into whether creative people actually do produce more justifications, and if the 
number of justifications provided for dishonesty affects a person's view of dishonest 
behavior. 
Purpose of This Project 
This project aims to look more closely at the mechanisms that connect creativity 
with dishonest behavior. Gino and Ariely (2012) suggest that creativity may help people 
generate various reasons to justify dishonest actions that they see as credible, and that the 
more easily justifications can be produced, the more likely someone will behave 
dishonestly. These justifications can serve as a mechanism for minimizing the perceived 
negative elements of the action, allowing one to morally disengage (Bandura, 1999). 
Gino & Ariely’s study found that when given opportunity to create justifications, those 
who were primed for creativity were not more likely to behave dishonestly than those 
who were not, but that creative personality led to greater likelihood of dishonestly, with 
or without opportunities for justifications (Gino & Ariely, 2012). The driving logic 
behind previous researchers’ connection between creativity and dishonesty (Gino & 
Ariely, 2012) is that no matter how creative a person is, if a large number of credible 
justifications are provided for a dishonest behavior, a person is more likely to condone it, 
and that creative people are able to produce more justifications, even when they have 
fewer opportunities to do so. This possibility has been suggested by researchers, but to 
date no research has been done to empirically investigate this specific idea. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE  
Creativity 
As described in the introduction, creativity is the focus of this study, and at first 
glance, it may seem like a well-understood term. The average person is likely to use the 
word creativity in their everyday language. Children are praised for being creative in their 
art projects, people are complimented on their creative room decorations, and employers 
often describe a way of completing a task at work as creative. Generally speaking, it 
would seem that most people share a common meaning of creativity. However, when it 
comes to defining creativity for the purposes of scientific research, the definition is a 
little harder to pin down. For example, should creativity be measured based on past 
achievements, self-perceptions, thought processes, task performance, or something else 
entirely? Also, how does one determine if an activity is especially creative? Experts? 
How should one determine who a creative expert is? Should it be by number of creative 
achievements or notable creative achievements, or something else?  Because there are so 
many dimensions of creativity and many different ways to operationalize it, research on 
“creativity” may, in fact, address very different aspects of creativity, sometimes 
producing results based on very different criteria. 
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A working definition of creativity for this project is the rendering of original 
ideas, original working and thinking processes, and original products (Barron, 1955; 
Simonton, 2003), and the ability to produce novel ideas that are also adaptive. (Amabile, 
1988; Runco & Jaeger, 2012). Based on research by Gino and Ariely (2012), this project 
will be measure creativity using a person’s own view of their creativity (how would they 
describe themselves), and how many creative achievements they have completed in their 
lifetime. This certainly does not encompass all of the ways creativity can be measured, 
and these measurements can be applied in several different ways to define creativity, but 
it is a reasonable place to start because this definition includes elements of both 
divergence and flexibility that appear repeatedly in scholarly descriptions of and research 
regarding creativity (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Barron, 1955; 
Beaussart, Andrews, and Kaufman, 2013; Getzels & Jackson, 1962; Gino & Ariely, 
2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Guilford, 1975; Silvia, 2008; Simonton, 2003; 
Torrance, 1959; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). 
One characteristic of creativity that is of interest in this project is an ability and 
willingness to bend or break established structures in a way that produces desirable 
outcomes. The creative person sees the guidelines presented for a particular task and is 
willing to be flexible to achieve oftentimes not only the original goal, but also self-
expression (Getzels & Jackson, 1962). Creative people possess fluid, flexible thinking and 
produce original ideas that are appropriate for the situation (Amabile, Conti, Coon, 
Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Torrance, 1959). This willingness and flexibility may play a role 
in a creative person’s tendency towards dishonesty. 
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The Structure of Intellect Model (Guilford, 1975) offers a bit of background that 
may explain some of the creativity/dishonesty connection. In this model, divergent thinking, 
the ability to think of unique answers to a question, is thought to be a key precursor to 
creativity (Guilford, 1975). That is, the creative thinker has original ideas, new perspectives 
on existing ideas, and more ideas in general (Silvia, 2008; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). 
Sometimes included in divergent thinking are dishonest solutions to problems.  
Creative people remain open to the world, willing and able to see things differently 
than others, including those of authority and those whom they care for. Creativity has been 
found to have a positive relationship with openness to experience scores on the NEO (Baer 
& Oldham, 2006; Feist, 1998; Shalley et al., 2004). Creative people’s ideas are not bound 
by the conventional, giving them a tendency to satisfy desires that are traditionally inhibited 
(Getzels & Jackson, 1962), and a likelihood to do so through dishonest means (Gino & 
Ariely, 2012). 
Some scholars believe that creativity is about cognitive flexibility as well as 
divergent thinking (Spiro & Jehng, 1990). While divergent thinking involves producing a 
higher number of ideas as well as more original and complex ideas (Guilford, 1975; Silvia, 
2008; Wallach & Kogan, 1965), cognitive flexibility is the ability to adapt to people, 
situations, and environments by restructuring knowledge (Rende, 2000). Flexibility in one’s 
thinking can help solve problems (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988), allowing someone to “roll 
with the punches” of life, so to speak. In other words, a creative person may have a wider 
arsenal of coping strategies (Runco, 2004), and a stronger ability to think beyond the 
confines of one’s preconceptions (Ward, Thompson, Lake, Ely, & Kaminski, 2008). The 
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extension of this idea is the question of whether a creative person will be just as apt to think 
divergently and be flexible with acceptance of dishonesty. 
Development of Moral Theory 
The goal of this project is to understand more about why some creative people are 
more dishonest, and so, it is useful to get an understanding of why people in general may be 
dishonest or where our ideas about honesty come from in the first place. Definitions of and 
theories related to morality are as diverse as those on creativity. However, a survey of 
current theories about morality will reveal certain commonalities that are uncontroversial. 
One of these is the idea that emotions play an especially important role in moral 
development, moral persuasion, and moral decision making (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001; 
Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2012; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Pizarro, 2000). 
The Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2001) builds on the idea of social 
intuitionism. In contrast to Kohlberg’s (1977) emphasis on cognitive processes in moral 
reasoning, Moral Foundations Theory argues that at their core, moral judgments, actions, 
and beliefs involve a primarily emotional process, with an interaction between emotions and 
rationalizations. When one comes across a situation in which a moral judgment can be 
made, an initial emotional reaction takes place based on instinctual values developed 
through a combination of biological and cultural evolutionary processes. Following the 
initial emotional reaction, a person will often rationalize his or her judgment, typically via 
unconscious processes (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2012; Haidt et al., 1993). Haidt theorizes that 
rationalizations are produced after moral judgments in order to support the preceding 
emotions, rather than before, and that moral judgments are not dependent on whether or not 
rationalizations successfully explain their emotions (Haidt, 2012; Margolis, 1987). 
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However, a more “chicken or the egg” relationship may exist, where emotions serve as 
motivations to produce justifications, and justifications alter moral emotions. The 
connection can be seen if a person with creative tendencies is to be able to produce 
justifications that allow them to manipulate their own emotions to more readily justify 
dishonesty. Creative people may be using superior divergent thinking skills and cognitive 
flexibility to persuade themselves to feel less morally convicted about dishonest behaviors. 
Mind Perception 
The interaction between cognitions and emotions is just one element involved in 
moral decisions. The interaction between people and even how we perceive people is 
worth investigating in connection to morality. It is not immoral for a person to get great 
joy out of kicking a soccer ball, but finding great joy in kicking a baby certainly is. Gray, 
Young, & Waytz (2012) argue that the difference between the two actions, and the 
essence of morality itself, comes down to “mind” perception. The use of the word “mind” 
refers to an understanding of and empathy towards the emotions, perceptions, and 
feelings of another. While we may have a sense of our own mind, we cannot objectively 
measure the existence of another’s mind. Sure, a friend can tell us that he is hurting or 
what he is thinking, and it is this that allows us to infer that he has a mind, but even brain 
scans and self-report measures offer only an indirect access into the mind, making it 
ultimately a matter of perception. It is when we perceive the minds of others that we can 
then work to understand what that mind is thinking, feeling, or desiring. If we view others 
as having a mind, then we can develop empathy for others, see them and ourselves as 
moral agents, and attribute moral rights and responsibilities to them (Bastian, Laham, 
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Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Gray et al., 2012). In other words, when we perceive the 
mind of another, we are more likely to treat others as we would want to be treated. 
Oftentimes, mind perception is not about whether or not a mind exists (e.g., rock 
vs. baby), but it is about deciding which agents deserve how much of our concern or 
moral intention—who or what we include in our “moral circle” (Pizarro, Detweiler-
Bedell, & Bloom, 2006). Attributing (or not attributing) agency, that is, a “mind”, to 
someone has been shown to affect the perception of one’s morality. If a person is able to 
deny to oneself that another has agency and is able to dehumanize the other in some way, 
they can effectively exclude that person from their moral circle, and then even harmful 
acts against him or her can be justified (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 
1996; Cikara, Eberhardt, & Fiske, 2011; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, 
& Galinsky, 2008; Harris & Fiske, 2011). 
The idea that morality is not just a cognitive exercise in reasoning as once thought 
(Kohlberg, 1977) but a flexible process involving interactions between both cognitions 
and feelings (Haidt, 2001; Pizarro, 2000) opens up the concept that deciding who/what to 
value morally, how to behave, and how we justify what we do involves more than just 
logic and can be influenced by our emotions, social environments, cultural histories, and 
personality traits - including creativity. 
Moral Disengagement 
To understand how a creative person may possess greater ability to manipulate his 
or her moral circle, it is important to understand how it is done in general. Bandura’s 
Social Cognitive Theory (1991) explains that the moral standards of an individual and/or 
society are formed not by using logic and reasoning to analyze potential benefits and 
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drawbacks alone. The theory proposes that it also includes the processes of observing 
how behaviors inflict suffering on others, what levels of suffering are present for actions 
(which can vary from action to action and individual to individual), how circumstances 
and intentions affect the perceived acceptability of certain actions, and how others are 
perceived. This affects how much it matters to someone if their actions bring harm. 
People may be capable of moral reasoning, but until they give agency to those around 
them, they are not going to act morally (Bandura, 1991). 
A person faces a moral dilemma when he or she wishes to behave in a self-
serving manner, but in doing so would be potentially harmful, as is the case with being 
dishonest. Engaging in potentially harmful behavior could affect not only others’ view of 
the person, but also his or her self-image. A person is likely to make a compromise of 
sorts; to behave “a bit” dishonestly to satisfy the self-serving desire, but not so much so 
as to affect ones positive self-image and moral reputation (Mead, Baumeister, Gino, 
Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009). By behaving “just a little” dishonestly, a person provides 
oneself the opportunity to produce justifications for the dishonest behavior (Ayal & Gino, 
2012; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009). For example, in one study, people selling a car were 
given the option to provide an estimation of mileage to the buyer based on a range. They 
found that the wider the range, the more likely the seller was to lie about the mileage, 
justifying the lie through the larger amount of uncertainty (Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). It 
would seem that the better skilled a person is at producing what they believe are 
reasonable justifications for dishonesty, the more likely they are to subscribe to them 
(Kunda, 1990). If someone is able to morally disengage, or in other words, separate one’s 
emotions and ideas about right and wrong from one’s own conduct, the likelihood of 
 11 
aggressive and harmful behaviors is heightened (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 
1975; Diener, 1977; Diener, Dineen, Endresen, Beaman, & Fraser, 1975; Haney, Banks, 
& Zimbardo, 1973; Milgram, 1974; Tilker, 1970). Essentially, when people morally 
disengage, they convince themselves that the rules do not apply specifically to them in 
their specific situation. This is where the connection to creativity can be made in that a 
creative person may be more skilled at producing more, and more convincing, 
justifications. 
According to Bandura (1996), there are many ways that a person can justify 
engagement in behavior they would normally see as wrong, such as dishonesty. Tilker 
(1970) found that when a person is made fully responsible for the safety of another, and 
they are receiving both visual and auditory feedback from that person, they are more 
likely to behave in a socially responsible manner towards him or her (Tilker, 1970). This 
supports the idea that moral behavior hinges on both seeing oneself and others as a 
human being with thoughts, feelings, and value. 
Another method of moral disengagement is to choose to view a harmful or 
immoral behavior as something that furthers a good, moral cause, or as required for self-
defense (Bandura, 1996; Kelman, 1973; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Kramer, 1990; 
Smelser, 1971). Also, language is a powerful tool in justifying behavior. Rewording 
things to seem “better” can be powerfully disinhibiting (Bandura, 1996; Diener et al., 
1975) and can make behaviors seem less reprehensible or even respectable (Bolinger, 
1980; Lutz, 1987). Examples of this in everyday life include telling a “white lie” rather 
than deceiving, “venting” rather than gossiping, or “borrowing” rather than stealing. 
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Another way that a person may justify harmful or immoral behaviors is through 
displacing or diffusing responsibility (Bandura, 1996, 1999). For example, a person may 
believe that because they only participated in one small part of something immoral, what 
they had done was done was not actually wrong. This moral disengagement was seen 
among many involved in The Holocaust, explaining that they, for example, only 
transported prisoners, kept records, or so on (Andrus, 1969). Similarly, if a dishonest 
behavior becomes routinized and divided across several people or departments, it 
becomes easier for a person to justify it, allowing them to see even acts of murder as “all 
in a day’s work” (Kelman, 1973). 
In the study by Diener et al. (1975), people were found to be almost 38 times as 
aggressive when they believed they were not going to be held accountable for their 
behavior, observed a model enacting aggressive behavior, or were put into a mindset to 
see their aggressive behaviors as a game (Diener, et al., 1975; Milgram, 1974). 
Another way that someone may create justification for immoral behaviors is 
through dehumanization. The act of dehumanization changes patterns of thought and 
changes the view of the person to one with diminished or no feelings, hopes, needs or 
concerns (Duster, 1971; Keen, 1986; Kelman, 1973). When dehumanization occurs, it 
becomes more likely that a person will create moral justifications for aggressive or 
harmful actions against the dehumanized individual (Bandura et al., 1975; Duster, 1971; 
Milgram, 1974). History has shown that moral disengagement has contributed to crimes 
against humanity (Andrus, 1969; Keen, 1986; Kelman, 1973; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; 
Rapoport & Alexander, 1982; Reich, 1990). When given an opportunity to justify self-
serving or dishonest behaviors, a person is more likely to engage in the dishonesty than 
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when not given the opportunity for justifications (Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002; Shalvi, 
Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011; Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979). If a creative 
person is able to produce opportunities for justification and moral disengagement, this 
may explain the positive relationship between creativity and dishonesty. 
Creativity and Morality 
Haidt and colleagues have made the case that morality and moral judgments are in 
many ways socially driven (Haidt, 2001, 2012; Haidt et al., 1993) and are affected by our 
perceptions of others as well as our emotions towards them (Haidt, 2012; Miller, 1997; 
Pizarro et al., 2006; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). We have also learned that creative 
people are capable of taking what they are given and producing new ideas, conclusions, and 
products, often with the effect of persuading others to view ideas and situations differently 
(Pizarro et al., 2006; Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Silvia 2008; Simonton, 2003; Torrance, 1959;). 
Thus, it seems plausible that creative people are more likely to be able to manipulate the 
cognitive and emotional interaction, shaping and re-directing empathy and related emotions 
when making moral decisions so as to justify what would otherwise seem immoral, such as 
dishonesty. 
Pizarro et al. (2006) propose that throughout history, it was those who resonate with 
and sway others’ emotions—the poets, public speakers, politicians, musicians, and artists—
that challenged and changed the moral beliefs of individuals and societies. Through creative 
uses of language, images, stories, songs, and movies, the shifting of the ideas on right and 
wrong is influenced by emotions. Gino and Ariely (2012) found that when someone is 
primed to think creatively, they are more likely to behave dishonestly. They suggest that this 
is because creative people are able to generate more justifications, making the dishonesty 
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more likely to occur. For the creative person, an ethical dilemma poses a difficult situation 
for which they may have a unique set of skills that allow them to produce creative solutions. 
When problems are difficult, a creative person’s cognitive flexibility combines with 
divergent thinking to create a fertile environment for a justification process favoring self-
serving conclusions, and ultimately, moral disengagement (Gino & Ariely, 2012). 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The primary purpose of this study is to clarify the nature of the relationship 
between dishonesty and creativity. It is possible that creative people will generate more 
justifications for dishonest behavior than less creative people. If this is true, it is perhaps 
the mere exposure to more justifications for dishonesty that results in more dishonest 
behavior. For this study, justifications are defined as statements or ideas that lesson the 
perceived harm an action causes, or perceived moral wrong committed (Haidt 2001, 
Hauser, 2006; Hauser et al., 2007). 
This line of reasoning rests on two assumptions. First, that creative people are 
able to generate more justifications for dishonest behavior, and second, that generating 
more justifications for dishonesty tends to make people more tolerant of their own 
dishonest behavior. Based on these ideas, four hypotheses were developed: 
Hypothesis 1: Scores on creativity measurements will be correlated with numbers 
of justifications produced for dishonest behavior (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model for Hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2: The number of justifications for a dishonest behavior will be 
correlated with the perceived acceptability of the behavior, supporting the idea that it will 
be more likely for someone to engage in the behavior (Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Model for Hypothesis 2. 
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Hypothesis 3: The number of justifications for a dishonest behavior will act as a 
mediator between creativity and the perception of acceptability of the behavior (Figure 
1). 
Hypothesis 4: Social desirability scores on the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding (BIDR) measure will moderate the relationship between creativity and the 
number of justifications. Although not a focus of this study, it is expected that the BIDR 
will have a negative correlation with the perceived acceptability of dishonesty (Figure 1). 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Participants 
A total of 205 people participated in this study. Data from two participants were 
excluded; one participant did not speak English fluently, and the other appeared to be 
under the influence of mind-altering substances. This left a final sample of 203 
participants between the ages of 18-46 (M = 19.6, SD = 2.6). The participants were asked 
to indicate their age, sex, ethnicity, GPA, and estimated parental income. Table 1 
summarizes these demographic variables. All participants gave written informed consent. 
The procedure was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Illinois State 
University. Participants were selected from the Illinois State University Psychology 
Research Participant Pool. 
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Table 1 
Demographic Data Frequencies and Percentages 
Variable Frequency Percent 
Age   
18 69 34.0 
19 54 26.6 
20 45 22.2 
21 18 8.9 
22–29 15 7.3 
30–34 1 .5 
45–49 1 .5 
Gender   
Male 38 18.7 
Female 165 81.3 
Race/Ethnicity   
African-American 12 5.9 
Native American 1 .5 
East Asian 1 .5 
South Asian 2 1.0 
White (not Hispanic) 170 83.7 
Other 1 .5 
GPA   
1.5-1.99 3 1.5 
2.0-2.49 4 2.0 
2.5-2.99 27 13.3 
3.0-3.49 61 30.0 
3.5-3.74 50 24.6 
3.75-3.99 35 17.2 
4.0 20 9.9 
Missing 3 1.5 
Parent Income   
Less than $5000 1 .5 
$5000-$20000 11 5.4 
$20000-$60000 46 22.7 
$60000-$100000 70 34.5 
$100000-$150000 46 22.7 
>$150000 26 12.8 
Missing 3 1.5 
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Measures 
Measures were chosen to parallel the instruments used by Gino and Ariely (2012) 
in their research on the relationship between creativity and dishonesty. Two creativity 
assessments were chosen. 
Creativity Personality Scale 
Gough’s Creative Personality Scale (Gough, 1979) is a self-report measure of 
creativity as a part of the Adjective Check List. It is a 30-item self-report survey of 
various personality characteristics. The survey was originally developed to be used by 
observers in describing others, but evolved into a self-report measure. The checklist asks 
participants to select adjectives from a list that describes their personality, but can also be 
used to identify a person’s ideal self, beliefs, values, ideal mate or almost anything else 
the adjectives could describe. 
The current version of the checklist has 37 different subscales, one of which is 
Creative Personality. The Creative Personality Scale of the Adjective Checklist asks 
participants to read a list of 30 adjectives and select the ones that best describe them. 
Some of the adjectives on the list relate to creativity (e.g., insightful, original, 
unconventional), and the participants receive a point for every one of the creativity-tied 
adjectives that they select. 
To develop the Creativity Personality Scale itself, the Adjective Checklist was 
administered to 1,701 individuals from a wide range of ages and careers, all with direct or 
inferred ratings of creativity available for the individuals. An item analysis was 
completed of the six different scales of the checklist that had been previously established 
as measures of creativity (Schaefer, 1972, 1973; Smith & Schaefer; 1969; Welsh, 1977), 
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and found that 30 items were positively and significantly (p < .01) correlated with those 
six scales. These 30 items became the Creativity Personality Scale. For this scale, α 
coefficients ranged between .73 and .81. 
Even while using samples from a wide range of careers, ages, and testing 
circumstances and employing four different perspectives on creativity (expert judges, 
faculty members, personality-assessment staff observers, and life-history interviewers), 
10 out of 12 of the validity coefficients were significant (p ≤ .05). The criteria chosen 
were the Domino creativity measurement, the Schaefer creativity measurement, Welsh 
origence/intellectence (high/low combinations of both origence and intellectence), rating 
by expert judges, ratings by faculty members, ratings by assessment staff, and rating by 
interviewers. 
Creative Behavior Inventory 
Another creativity measure used in Gino and Ariely’s (2012) research was 
Hocevar’s Creative Behavior Inventory (Hocevar, 1980). Participants were presented 
with a list of accomplishments and activities that are associated with creativity (e.g., 
wrote an original computer program not for school or university work, painted an original 
picture not as a part of school or university work). The participants then indicated 
whether they had done each of the activities or accomplishments in their adolescent and 
adult life never, once or twice, 3–5 times, or more than 5 times. To score, a sum of the 
participant’s ratings is calculated. 
The Creative Behavior Inventory was developed initially by asking college 
students to list their most creative achievements. Experts rated the list that was produced, 
and the items that received the lowest ratings were removed. 90 items were developed. 
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The inventory was used in other studies, finding that several Creative Behavior Inventory 
subscales correlate with ideational fluency. The internal consistency of the Creative 
Behavior Inventory overall is .91 (Dollinger, Urban, & James, 2004). The measurement 
items were also originally grouped into six categories (literary accomplishments, 
performance arts, crafts, music, and math/science). With the exception of math and 
science, all of the categories halve Cronbach α coefficients ranging between .75 and .87. 
The math and science category has a Cronbach α coefficient of .53 (Dollinger et al., 
2004). In the current study, the Cronbach α for the total scale of the Creative Behavior 
Inventory was .89. 
If the two measures of creativity are measures of the same aspect of creativity, 
they should have robust correlations with each other. In the study by Gino and Ariely 
(2012), the correlation between the Creative Behavior Inventory and the Creative 
Personality Scale varied from experiment to experiment from .33 to .45. In the current 
study, the correlation between scores from the Creative Behavior Inventory and the 
Creative Personality Scale was r(203) = .11, p = .12, possibly indicating that the two 
scales may be measuring different aspects of creativity in this sample. For this reason, 
they were not combined into a creativity composite score. Instead, these two measures 
were considered separately in all evaluations of hypotheses involving creativity. 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test 
The current study asked the participants to list as many justifications they were 
able to think of. A measure of verbal fluency was administered to ensure that the 
participants who produced more justifications were not simply more apt at creating lists. 
Consequently, there may have arisen a need to control for speed of thought. 
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 The Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) (Benton, Hamsher, & 
Rey, 1994) is a brief measure of verbal fluency. For this assessment, the participants were 
asked to list as many words as they could that start with the letters F, A, and then S. 
Proper nouns, numbers and multiple versions of the same word (i.e. fasted and fasting) do 
not count. Additionally, the participants were asked to list as many animals and girls’ 
names (or boys’ names if male participants) they could think of, as well as creating 
alternating lists of furniture and fruit, and clothing and sports. Higher numbers indicate 
higher levels of verbal fluency. 
The COWAT was originally developed as verbal fluency test for people suffering 
from brain injuries. It was oral rather than written (as previous measures had been) to 
accommodate for those with damage that prevented them from using their writing hand 
or who suffered from arthritis. It was also designed to be short to improve on previous 
tests that were seen as tiring and tedious for people who were already in poor physical 
condition. The COWAT has a coefficient α of .83 and a 6-month test-retest reliability of 
.74 (Ruff, Light, & Parker, 1996). In the current study, the coefficient α was .80.  In this 
study, the COWAT did not correlate with any of the elements we measure for this study, 
and so its use was not necessary for the main analyses. 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding  
Because this study is focusing on dishonest behaviors, there was a risk that 
participants may have felt influenced to respond in certain ways based on perceived 
social pressure. Therefore, the participants were given the Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991). The BIDR is the research version of the 
commercial product known as the Paulhus Deception Scale. It measures two forms of 
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desirable responding, Impression Management (IM) and Self-Deceptive Enhancement 
(SDE). Impression Management is intended to measure a person’s tendency to deceive 
others by deliberately inflating self-descriptions. Self-Deceptive Enhancement is intended 
to measure inflated self-descriptions that result from unconscious favorable biases rather 
than conscious deception. For the assessment itself, respondents read 40 statements, and 
indicate how true that statement was on a 7-point scale ranging from not true to true. For 
most participants, it takes about 3 to 5 minutes to complete. 
The BIDR was developed based on the theory that self-deception consists of two 
dimensions: the unconscious effort to deny thoughts and feelings that produce 
psychological conflicts, and a conscious effort to portray oneself in the best light 
possible. While it is difficult to measure and unconscious bias objectively, the Impression 
Management scale is highly correlated with lie scales, such as Eysenck’s Lie scale, and 
the MMPI Lie scale, measures of role-playing, such as Wiggins’ SD, and Gough’s Gi, 
and the scale is also correlated with agreeableness and conscientiousness scores (Paulhus, 
1991). These connections to measures of a person’s motivations for social approval, have 
contributed to its wide use and acceptability as a scale (Li, & Bagger, 2006). The items 
were originally developed to reflect these two ideas rationally, and each subsequent 
version of the measure involved adjustments to the items that reflected the latest 
empirical studies, conceptual rationales, and practitioner consults.  
This measurement of an unconscious bias is difficult, but the BIDR works to 
come as close as possible. It doesn’t ask directly, for example, do you inflate your 
descriptions of yourself, but rather, it asks participants to answer several questions that 
most people would not answer yes to, for example, I never cover up my mistakes. A 
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person who answers yes to a great deal of these items may have an unconscious positive 
bias 
Internal consistency data for 884 male and female college students were reported 
with an overall internal consistency α at .83. The α coefficients for Self-Deception ranged 
from .68 to .80 and from .75 to .86 for Impression Management. (Paulhus, 1988) Test-
retest correlations for Self-Deceptive Enhancement and Impression Management were 
.69 and .65 respectively, with a 5-week waiting period between tests (Paulhus, 1988). 
Concurrent validity was assessed by correlating the test with the Marlowe-Crowne Scale 
(r = .71; Paulhus, 1988) and the Social Desirability Inventory (r = .80; Jacobson, 
Kellogg, Cauce, & Slavin, 1977). For this study, the α coefficients for Self-Deception 
was .66, and was .79 for Impression management. The weak coefficient for Self-
Deception is discussed in the limitations secion. 
International Personality Item Pool 
The International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999) is a 50-item 
personality measure of the Big-Five factor markers of Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect/Imagination (Goldberg, 1992). For 
this measure, participants were asked to read statements and indicate how accurate the 
statement is on a 5-point scale ranging from very inaccurate to very accurate. Examples 
of items included are “Am the life of the party,” “Have a vivid imagination,” and “Have 
excellent ideas.”  
The IPIP was created in response to the thousands of personality measures 
developed over 75 years of study. The developers saw that the measures assessing broad 
personality traits were often copyrighted and rarely tested or improved. They decided to 
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produce a public domain personality measure to allow scientists to freely use, assess, and 
report findings to each other with the goal of improving personality measurement and 
furthering research in the area. The goal was to create a measure with scales mirroring 
those in other established measures. They developed 45 initial scales targeting the AB5C 
scales. The AB5C is a model of the personality domain based on the big five factors of 
personality (Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992). Of these, 43 had α coefficients of .70 
or higher and 18 with reliabilities at or above .80. Additionally, the IPIP contains 30 
constructs similar to the 30 facet scales in the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 2008) with 
average Cronbach α scores at .80, higher than the NEO scales (.75). The IPIP also has 
scales designed to mirror the Sixteen Personality Factors Questionnaire, Cloninger's 
Temperament and Character Inventory, and Gough’s California Pathological Inventory, 
all finding inter item correlations, Cronbach’s α scores, and average α scores at or above 
the original measures themselves (Goldberg, 1999). The internal consistency data from 
the current study can be seen in Table 2. For this study, the IPIP was used mainly as a 
distraction task between study activities. 
Procedure 
The participants completed a moral justification generation task and a moral 
justification evaluation task. The tasks were completed in random order. In between 
tasks, the participants completed the IPIP as a distraction task. This was done to reduce 
any carryover effects that may have altered the participants’ performance on either task 
based on which one was completed first. 
Moral Justification Generation Task: When the participants arrived, they were 
brought into a room and informed consent was obtained. Next, the participants were 
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seated at a computer and read the following short vignette of a person who behaved 
dishonestly: 
A person was walking down a busy street and saw a stranger drop a large wad 
of cash without noticing. Rather than speaking up, the person quickly grabbed 
the money off the sidewalk and kept it. 
 The vignettes used in this study were created because previous studies do not contain 
vignettes used for the purpose of collecting justifications, as opposed to determining what 
the participant would do. It is important that the vignettes for this study are gender 
neutral, involve an act of dishonesty, and are short enough to allow the participant to 
project his or her own ideas and justifications onto it. 
After they read the vignette, the participants clicked “next” and saw the following 
instructions,  
In the space provided below, type out a reason that you think would justify what 
the person did. There is no need to use full sentences; if it helps you work, you 
can just write enough so some else can understand. Feel free to write as few or 
as many justifications as you want. When you’ve finished, click the button on the 
bottom of the screen that says “done.”  
 
Upon clicking “done,” the participants saw a screen instructing them to rate the 
acceptability of the dishonest behavior using a 5-point scale ranging from extremely 
unacceptable to extremely acceptable. When the participants finished writing their 
justifications, they clicked next, and the following vignette immediately appeared on the 
screen,  
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A student lived in a dormitory with one roommate and kept alcohol in the room 
against university policy. When the RA came by to inspect the room, the person 
put the alcohol in the roommate’s drawer and let the roommate take the 
punishment. 
The participants were then given the same instructions as in the previous task, and they 
typed their justifications and evaluation of the acceptability of the dishonest behavior.  
When the data was collected, it was observed that many participants did in fact 
type out justifications for the behaviors (e.g., “The person was in desperate need of 
money,” or “The roommate agreed to take the punishment.”). Other responses were not 
justifications, but rather, explanations (e.g., “No morals”) or other types of responses 
(e.g., “There is no justification for this behavior,” or “I would go up to the person and ask 
him or her to return the money to the stranger.”). Because the hypotheses were concerned 
specifically with justifications rather than responses per se, 205 of 925 responses (22%) 
were not included in the analyses because they were not justifications. Responses were 
eliminated only if they clearly represented a non-justification, as in the examples above. 
The items chosen for elimination were reviewed with the study’s committee chair. Even 
if all responses are included in the analyses, the conclusions of this study are not altered 
substantively. 
Moral Justification Evaluation Task: For the second task, the participants’ 
computer screen displayed this short vignette depicting dishonest behavior, 
A person was given an exam for a college course. While taking the test, the 
person noticed that the class assistant dropped the test key on the floor without 
noticing. The person picked up the key and used it to get 100% on the test. 
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When the participants clicked to the next screen, they were randomly presented with 
zero, two, four, or eight justifications for the dishonest behavior. The program was loaded 
with 15 justifications and the ones that appeared on the participants’ screens were 
selected at random. Participants were instructed to assume that the person believes the 
statements are true. The complete list of justifications was developed to reflect different 
moral disengagement practices commonly used (Bandura, 1996), and is as follows (the 
type of moral disengagement is listed in parentheses): 
 My grandmother died this last week, and so I did not have time to study 
(displacement of responsibility/attribution of blame). 
 If I did not get an A on this test, I would fail the class and be kicked out of school 
(displacement of responsibility). 
 Last test, I tried to get help from the assistant several times, but the assistant was 
rude and unhelpful (displacement of responsibility/attribution of blame). 
 I have never cheated in school before, and I will never do it again (displacement 
of responsibility). 
 The questions were about obscure facts from the book that are only meant to trick 
us (displacement of responsibility/attribution of blame). 
 I’ve seen a lot of people cheating in this class before—it’s not a big deal 
(distorting consequences/advantageous comparison). 
 I only cheated on a few items...I got most of them right on my own (distorting the 
consequences/euphemistic language). 
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 The professor is a graduate student from another country—half the time I can’t 
understand what the professor is saying (displacement of responsibility/attribution 
of blame/dehumanization). 
 I don’t even need this class for my major—I’ll never use the information 
(distorting consequences). 
 I have to work a job to pay for my tuition, and it’s just been a busy couple of 
weeks with everything going on (displacement of responsibility/attribution of 
blame). 
 I only cheated on this one test—other people plagiarized their entire final paper 
(advantageous comparison). 
 I was just taking advantage of an opportunity that came my way (euphemistic 
language). 
 It was the assistant’s responsibility to keep the key secure, not mine (displacement 
of responsibility). 
 The professor doesn’t grade on a curve so it didn’t lower anyone else’s grade 
(disregarding consequences). 
 With all the assaults and rapes happening around campus, checking a few answers 
on a test is not that big of a deal (advantageous comparison). 
For each of the justifications, the participants indicated how valid the justification is on a 
5-point scale ranging from not at all valid to extremely valid. Next, the participants were 
asked, “How acceptable was this person’s behavior?” and they indicated their opinion on 
a five point scale ranging from extremely unacceptable to extremely acceptable. 
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Assessment Tasks 
The participants completed the IPIP (Goldberg, 1999) to measure personality, the 
Creativity Personality Scale, and the Creative Behavior Inventory. The participants also 
completed the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1998) to assess for 
social desirability, and the COWAT (Benton, Hamsher, & Rey, 1994) to measure verbal 
fluency. The CPS and CBI were given after both tasks were completed to prevent any 
creativity priming that could have taken place if the participants were assessed for 
creativity beforehand. 
Demographics 
For this study demographic data was collected regarding the participants’ age, 
gender, race, GPA, and SES (see Table 2). 
Debriefing 
The participants were debriefed on the research in more detail. They were told 
that the purpose of the research was to examine connections between creativity and the 
number/types of justifications given for dishonest behavior. The participants were given 
the opportunity to ask any questions they may have before they leave.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the means, standard deviations, and Cronbach α coefficients for all 
measures used, as well as the participants’ reported acceptability ratings for both tasks. 
For task one, an average of the two vignettes was produced. 
Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach α Coefficients for All Measures Used and 
Acceptability Ratings 
Measure M SD α 
Creative Personality Scale 16.21 2.15 .63 
Creative Behavior Inventory 39.10 20.71 .89 
COWAT (z-score) 0.00 1.00 .80 
BIDR Self-Deception 4.06 .64 .66 
BIDR Impression Management 3.74 .78 .79 
IPIP NEO Extraversion 2.21 .82 .89 
IPIP NEO Agreeableness 3.18 .47 .75 
IPIP NEO Neuroticism 2.73 .64 .85 
IPIP NEO Conscientiousness 2.14 .74 .84 
IPIP NEO Openness 2.60 .52 .75 
Self-Generated Justifications 3.48 2.45  
Task 1 Acceptability of Dishonesty .65 .56  
Task 2 Acceptability of Dishonesty .75 .84  
 
Hypothesis One 
The correlation of the Creative Behavior Inventory and the number of self-
generated justifications was significant, r(203) = .16, p = .02. The correlation of the 
Creative Personality Scale and the total number of self-generated justifications was not 
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significant, r(203) = −.07, p = .34. Even where this hypothesis was partially supported, 
the effect size was small. 
Hypothesis Two 
In the first task, the correlation of the total number of self-generated justifications 
and the average perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior was significant, r(203) = 
.14, p = .03. Although this correlation is consistent with the hypothesis, it should be noted 
that it is quite small. 
In the second task, the correlation of the total number of manipulated 
justifications given and the average perceived acceptability of the dishonest behavior was 
not significant, r(203) = .09, p = .20. However, as seen in Figure 3, it appears that the 
relationship between perceived acceptability and the number of evaluated justifications is 
non-linear. 
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Figure 3. Mean Task 2 Perceived Acceptability Ratings as a Function of the Number of 
Justifications for Dishonesty.  
 
To test the non-linear effect of justifications in an exploratory follow-up analysis, 
the predictor was treated as an ordinal variable and the polynomial contrast was 
evaluated. Because the outcome variable was a single-item Likert scale with five 
categories, ordered logistic regression was conducted instead of ordinary least squares 
regression. The polr function from the MASS package (Venables & Ripley, 2002) was 
used to compute an ordered logistic regression analysis in the R statistical computing 
environment (Version 3.2; R Core Team, 2015). In Table 3, the cubic effect of 
justifications is significant.  
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Table 3 
Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients for the Polynomial Effects of Justification 
Exposure and Evaluation on the Perceived Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior in Task 2 
 Predictor 𝑏  [95% CI] 𝜎𝑏 𝑡 
Justifications (Linear)  0.43 [−0.14, 1.00] 0.29 1.49 
Justifications (Quadratic) −0.44 [−0.99, 0.11] 0.28 −1.55 
Justifications (Cubic) 0.59* [0.06, 1.14] 0.27 2.16 
* p < .05 
In Figure 4, it can be seen that judging the behavior to be extremely unacceptable 
is most probable when no justifications have been evaluated and that exposure to at least 
some justifications is associated with less intolerant evaluations. 
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Figure 4. Model-Implied Response Probabilities When Number of Justifications Predicts 
the Perceived Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior in an Ordered Logistic Regression 
Model. 
 
To check the robustness of this finding, additional follow-up analyses were 
conducted in which the number of justifications was treated as a nominal variable. 
Compared to people who were not exposed to any justifications, people were 
significantly less likely to evaluate the dishonest behavior as extremely unacceptable 
when exposed to only two justifications (b = 1.16, 95% CI = [0.47, 1.86]) or eight 
justifications (b = 0.84, 95% CI = [0.03, 1.66]). Exposure to four justifications was also 
associated with a lower probability of harsh evaluation of the behavior (b = 0.55, 95% CI 
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= [−0.15, 1.27]), but this difference was not statistically significant. If the number of 
justifications variable is collapsed into two categories (No Justifications vs. Two or More 
Justifications), the effect still holds (b = 0.86, 95% CI = [0.31, 1.43]). 
Overall, this hypothesis was only partially and weakly supported. Although 
exposure to at least some justifications appears to lower the severity of participants’ 
judgments somewhat, as in fewer “extremely unacceptable” responses and more 
“unacceptable” responses. At four justifications, the two harshest responses met each 
other, still being the two most likely responses. Therefore, there is no evidence that the 
effect is cumulative, with additional justifications associated with more tolerance of 
dishonest behavior. 
Hypothesis Three 
As seen in Table 4, neither creativity measure was significantly correlated with 
perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior in either task. Because there is no observed 
relationship between creativity and perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior, there is 
no mediator to identify. 
Table 4 
Correlations of Creativity and Perceived Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior 
 Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior 
Measure Task 1 Task 2 
Creative Behavior Inventory −.08 −.05 
Creative Personality Scale −.002 −.07 
Note. None of the correlations are statistically significant. 
Despite the null results, the planned mediation analyses were conducted to evaluate the 
model from Figure 1 as a whole. The results of a path analysis generated from the R 
package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) are presented in Figure 5. In Figure 5, Statistically 
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significant standardized paths and correlations are bolded. Although the paths that make 
up the hypothesized indirect effect from the Creative Behavior Inventory to perceived 
acceptability of dishonesty via the number of self-generated justifications are both 
individually statistically significant, the product of the paths (i.e., the indirect effect) is 
not significant (b = .02, σb = 0.01, z = 1.47, p = .14). Furthermore, as is already known 
from the raw correlation, the total effect of the Creative Behavior Inventory on perceived 
acceptability of dishonest ratings is not statistically significant (b = .001, σb = 0.07, z = 
0.02, p = .98). Thus, this hypothesis was not supported. 
 
Figure 5. Path Analysis of the Task 1 Variables.  
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 38 
To evaluate Hypothesis 3 for Task 2 (see Figure 2), an ordered logistic regression 
was conducted similar to the analyses conducted for Hypothesis 2, with the addition of 
the two creativity measures and both social desirability measures as covariates. As seen 
in Table 5, neither creativity measure was a significant predictor of perceived 
acceptability. However, impression management was associated with less tolerant 
evaluations of dishonest behavior, as was exposure to at least some justifications (See 
Figure 6). 
Table 5 
Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients in Task 2 
Predictor 𝑏 [95% CI] 𝜎𝑏 𝑡 
Justifications (Linear) 0.34 [−0.24, 0.93] 0.30 1.16 
Justifications (Quadratic) −0.58* [−1.16, −0.02] 0.29 −2.01 
Justifications (Cubic) 0.64* [0.09, 1.20] 0.28 2.25 
Self-Deception 0.32 [−0.01, 0.66] 0.17 1.91 
Impression Management −0.74* [−1.05, −0.43] 0.16 −4.69 
Creative Behavior Inventory 0.04 [−0.24, 0.31] 0.14 0.29 
Creative Personality Scale −0.19 [−0.52, 0.13] 0.17 −1.18 
 * p < .05 
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Figure 6. Model-Implied Response Probabilities When Number of Justifications and 
Impression Management Predicts the Perceived Acceptability of Dishonest Behavior in 
an Ordered Logistic Regression Model. 
 
Hypothesis Four 
An evaluation of the hypothesized model implied by Figure 1 was conducted in a 
path analysis. As seen in Table 6, none of the interaction effects were statistically 
significant. Furthermore the interaction effect model did not significantly improve the 
model fit over the analogous main effects model in Figure 5, χ2(4) = 5.98, p = .20. 
Despite findings that show the connection between Impression Management and the 
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perceived acceptability of dishonesty, no moderating relationships were found, leaving 
this hypothesis as a whole unsupported. 
Table 6 
Path Analysis of Task 1 Variables with Standardized Variables and Interaction Terms 
Outcome ~ Predictor b 𝜎𝑏 z p 95% CI 
Justifications ~      
Creative Personality Scale 0.03 0.08 0.36 .72 [−0.13, 0.19] 
Creative Behavior Inventory 0.15 0.07 2.23 .03 [0.02, 0.29] 
Self-Deception −0.22 0.08 −2.70 .01 [−0.38, −0.06] 
Impression Management 0.01 0.07 0.14 .89 [−0.13, 0.15] 
CPI × SD 0.00 0.06 −0.06 .96 [−0.13, 0.12] 
CPI × IM 0.02 0.07 0.32 .75 [−0.11, 0.15] 
CBI × SD 0.04 0.08 0.46 .65 [−0.12, 0.20] 
CBI × IM 0.06 0.07 0.88 .38 [−0.08, 0.21] 
Acceptability ~  
    
Justifications 0.14 0.07 1.96 .05 [0.00, 0.27] 
Creative Personality Scale −0.04 0.08 −0.54 .59 [−0.19, 0.11] 
Creative Behavior Inventory −0.02 0.07 −0.28 .78 [−0.15, 0.12] 
Self-Deception −0.05 0.08 −0.58 .56 [−0.20, 0.11] 
Impression Management −0.25 0.07 −3.64 .00 [−0.39, −0.12] 
Note. CPI = Creative Personality Scale, CBI = Creative Behavior Inventory, SD = Self-
Deception, IM = Impression Management 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Conclusions 
Hypothesis One 
The first task asked the participants to produce their own justifications for 
dishonest behavior, and it was found that those who scored high in the Creative Behavior 
Inventory were able to produce more justifications overall, supporting the conclusions of 
previous research (Gino & Ariely, 2012), but not those who scored high on the Creative 
Personality Scale. Thus the hypothesis that creative people are able to generate 
justifications for dishonesty quickly is only partially and weakly supported. 
 For this study, the two measures of creativity did not correlate with each other, 
and this result may speak to the wide variety of ways that creativity can be measured (i.e., 
self-reported personality traits and self-reported creative productivity). A follow-up study 
would be required to explain why one measure of creativity was correlated with number 
of justifications generated while the other was not. One possibility may be that the 
Creative Behavior Inventory measured reports of actual participant activities and 
experience, and creating justifications was a creative performance task as well. Those 
who scored high on the Creative Personality Scale simply viewed themselves as creative, 
whereas those who scored high in the Creative Behavior Inventory had actually 
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completed creative activities. However, previous research has found that global measures 
of attitude do not accurately predict specific behaviors, with correlations rarely reaching 
higher than .40 (Ajzen & Fishbein 1977; Kraus, 1995; McGuire, 1985; Wicker, 1969), 
and so this connection may or may not explain the findings. 
It is important to note that the Creative Behavior Inventory had an α coefficient of 
.89 and produced a significant correlation with number of justifications, while the 
Creative Personality Scale did not and only had an α coefficient of .63. The low 
reliability of the Creative Personality Scale may be contributing to the non-significant 
findings. 
Hypothesis Two 
In the first task, the total number of justifications produced was correlated with 
the average perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior. It is this element that has been 
implied previously (Gino & Ariely, 2012), but was not directly measured. While the 
finding was significant, it is important to point out two ideas. First, the effect size was 
small. Second, despite this effect, the average perceived acceptability of the behavior was 
still between extremely unacceptable and unacceptable. Nevertheless, even small effects, 
when aggregated over a lifetime can add up to large differences in life outcomes (Barrick 
& Mount, 2005). 
In the second task, the number of justifications provided was not significantly 
correlated with the perceived acceptability of the dishonest behavior. However, further 
investigation found a non-linear relationship. Specifically, the number of “extremely 
unacceptable responses” was lowered, and the number of “unacceptable” responses 
increased when exposed to justifications. Overall, the behavior is still seen as less widely 
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extremely unacceptable, but more broadly unacceptable. These findings may suggest that 
the justifications provided opportunities for the participants to morally disengage from 
what may otherwise be extremely harsh evaluations of the behavior (Bandura, 1991). 
It is most likely that a person will view a dishonest behavior as extremely 
unacceptable when no justifications have been evaluated and that exposure to at least 
some justifications is associated with less intolerant evaluations. With two justifications, 
participants were more likely to still perceive the behavior as unacceptable, just not 
extremely unacceptable. Although exposure to at least some justifications appears to 
lower the severity of participants’ judgments somewhat, there is no evidence that the 
effect is cumulative, with additional justifications associated with less intolerance of 
dishonest behavior.  
The action of reading a person’s justifications may allow the participant to 
consider the mind of and identify with the person acting dishonestly (Pizarro et al, 2006; 
Young & Waytz, 2012), allowing them to identify with the person and their decision to 
morally disengage (Bandura, 1991).  
Hypothesis Three 
 This study was unable to find any significant connection between creativity and 
perceived acceptability of dishonest behavior whether the participants were presented 
with justifications or asked to produce their own. Despite this, different indirect paths that 
one could go from creativity to perceived acceptability of dishonesty were investigated. 
In the first task, a significant path was found from the Creative Behavior Inventory to the 
number of self-generated justifications, and then another significant path was found from 
the number of self-generated justifications to perceived acceptability of dishonesty. 
 44 
However, the hypothesized indirect effect was not large enough to be statistically 
significant.  
Hypothesis Four 
While a significant relationship was found between scores on the Creative 
Behavior Inventory and the number of self-generated justifications, no other significant 
relationships or moderating relationships were found. It is difficult to draw conclusions 
on why this may be so without additional follow-up studies. Additionally, several 
negative correlations were found between perceived acceptability of dishonesty and 
measures of social desirability. 
During the process of investigating the model, it was found that impression 
management was associated with less tolerant evaluations of dishonest behavior, and as 
previously reported in Hypothesis 2, exposure to at least some justifications was 
associated with evaluating dishonest behavior less harshly. 
Impression management was associated with less tolerant evaluations of dishonest 
behavior. When impression management was low, there were more “unacceptable” 
evaluations, than “extremely unacceptable” evaluations, but when Impression 
Management was high, there were more “extremely unacceptable” evaluations than 
“unacceptable” evaluations. When people are concerned with out they appear to others, 
they are more likely to view dishonest behaviors extremely harshly. This coincides with 
research that explains how one’s desire to be viewed as a moral person affect one’s 
choices of behavior, as well as how one believes they will be viewed by others (Mead, 
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009). However, because these relationships 
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were not of direct focus in the study and no moderating relationships were found, this 
hypothesis as a whole is unsupported. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
This study had some limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the 
participants were asked to produce justifications and perceived acceptability ratings on 
the dishonest behaviors of others. In previous studies, the participants were put into 
situations where they were dishonest for their own personal gain, rather than given the 
opportunity to consider the dishonesty of another. Future studies should allow the 
participants to personally gain from dishonesty while measuring number of justifications. 
It is possible that since the participants were not asked to justify their own lies, they were 
more likely to align their motivating emotions towards justifying a moral stance against 
dishonesty, as seen in several studies (Haidt, 2001, 2012; Haidt et al., 1993), rather than 
justifying the dishonesty. Perhaps it is not simply that creative people are more dishonest 
in general, but that they are more dishonest when properly motivated to be so, and such 
motivation may produce more robust findings. This leads to an additional research 
question of “How does personal motivation affect one’s view of dishonesty?” 
Additionally, three items from the Creative Personality Scale were unintentionally 
omitted (clever, snobbish, and unconventional). The scale used in the current study was a 
simple sum of the 27 remaining items (after reverse scoring the negatively keyed items). 
In this study, the α coefficient for this scale was 0.63. Had the three omitted items been 
included, the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula estimates that the reliability coefficient 
might have been a little higher (α = .65), assuming that the omitted items were equally 
good indicators as the 27 items that were included. Even at 0.65, this is only marginally 
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acceptable. Achieving higher reliability with this measure may have resulted in a higher 
correlation with the Creative Behavior Inventory, and the low reliability observed for this 
measure may be contributing to the non-significant results. In a similar fashion, the low 
reliability of the Self-Deception Scale of the BIDR observed in this sample may have 
attenuated its predictive validity. 
Third, a programming error resulted in the omission of the single-justification 
condition in Task 2. The intended manipulation was 0, 1, 2, 4, and 8 justifications instead 
of 0, 2, 4, and 8 justifications. Though regrettable, this error is unlikely to have altered 
the results substantially. Even if there is something fundamentally different about the 
experience of reading a single justification instead of multiple justifications, the original 
hypothesis that exposure to multiple justifications has a cumulative effect on one’s 
tolerance of dishonesty would not have been supported.  
For this study, the majority of participants were between the ages of 18 and 20. At 
this stage, many are only beginning to live independently, and their list of creative 
achievements may include activities that their schools and/or families 
required/encouraged. Additionally, their influences on self-view may still be heavily 
reliant on their parents. Personality is impacted by a number of factors, including 
environment (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2010). Some related research questions may be: 
 How do people of different age groups view dishonesty?  
 What role does creativity play in a person’s view of dishonesty over the lifespan? 
 Are children more likely to justify their dishonest behavior?  
 How does creativity manifest itself in middle aged versus young adults? 
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 Finally, in Task 1, the participants were asked to generate justifications for 
dishonest behavior. Of the 925 responses, 205 of them were not justifications. This may 
have been due to the style of administration. The participants completed the task on a 
computer, with directions read aloud to them over the computer, and were asked to type 
their responses. Perhaps if task one was given with a human reading the directions and 
recording their responses, the directions could be further clarified, cutting down on the 
number of non-justification responses.  
 Additionally, the existence of these non-justifications bring up additional 
opportunities for study. Perhaps some of the participants were exhibiting moral 
indignation at an authority asking them to justify dishonesty, leading to questions of 
authority and morality as famously studied (Milgram, 1963). Some of the non-
justifications involved a participant essentially thinking out loud, and these responses 
may inspire future studies into how personal narratives effect the way people view 
themselves and their role as moral agents. 
 Overall, when it comes to creativity and honesty, the relationship appears to be 
complicated.   A person’s feelings and thoughts about right and wrong interact with each 
other, and motivations seems to play an important role in how people view dishonesty. 
This study found mixed results for whether creative people can produce more 
justifications, and this may be due to what element of creativity is being measured, 
motivation, or other factors. Justifications do seem related to perceived acceptability of 
dishonesty, but again, this relationship is complicated, depending on who is lying, who is 
producing justifications, and other possible factors. Finally, this study was unable to find 
any significant connection between creativity and perceived acceptability of dishonest 
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behavior, contrary to previous studies. In the end, what’s left are more questions than 
answers, and rich possibilities for future investigations.
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
Demographics Form 
 
1. Age: 
2. Gender:  
3. Ethnicity:  
4. Year in School:  
5. College Major: 
6. Approximate ISU GPA: 
7. Sexual Orientation:  
8. Mother’s Highest Educational Level:  
9. Father’s Highest Educational Level:  
10. Mother’s Approximate Income:  
11. Father’s Approximate Income: 
12. Creativity Personality Scale 
 
Instructions: Read the following list of adjectives. Circle the ones that you think best 
describe you. 
 
1. affected 
2. capable 
3. cautious 
4. commonplace 
5. confident 
6. conservative 
7. conventional 
8. dissatisfied 
9. egotistical 
10. honest 
11. humorous 
12. individualistic 
13. informal 
14. insightful 
15. intelligent 
16. interests narrow 
17. interests wide 
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18. inventive 
19. mannerly 
20. original 
21. reflective 
22. resourceful 
23. self-confident 
24. sexy 
25. sincere 
26. submissive 
27. suspicious 
 
Controlled Oral Word Association 
 
Given one minute for each, write as many words as you can think of that begin with the 
following  
 
letters: 
F, A, S 
 
Categories: 
Animals, names, furniture/fruit, clothing/sports 
 
International Personality Item Pool 
 
How Accurately Can You Describe Yourself? 
 
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe 
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same 
sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest 
manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Indicate for each statement 
whether it is Very Inaccurate, Moderately Inaccurate, Neither Accurate Nor Inaccurate, 
Moderately Accurate, or Very Accurate as a description of you. 
 
1 -------------------- 2 ----------- 3 ----------- 4 ----------- 5 
 
Very Inaccurate                             Neither                  Very Accurate 
 
1. Am the life of the party. 
2. Feel little concern for others. 
3. Am always prepared. 
4. Get stressed out easily. 
5. Have a rich vocabulary. 
6. Don’t talk a lot. 
7. Am interested in people. 
8. Leave my belongings around. 
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9. Am relaxed most of the time. 
10. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 
11. Feel comfortable around people. 
12. Insult people. 
13. Pay attention to details. 
14. Worry about things. 
15. Have a vivid imagination. 
16. Keep in the background. 
17. Sympathize with others’ feelings. 
18. Make a mess of things. 
19. Seldom feel blue. 
20. Am not interested in abstract ideas. 
21. Start conversations 
22. Am not interested in other people’s problems. 
23. Get chores done right away. 
24. Am easily disturbed. 
25. Have excellent ideas. 
26. Have little to say. 
27. Have a soft heart. 
28. Often forget to put things back in their proper place. 
29. Get upset easily. 
30. Do not have a good imagination 
31. Talk to a lot of different people at parties. 
32. Am not really interested in others. 
33. Like order. 
34. Change my mood a lot. 
35. Am quick to understand things. 
36. Don’t like to draw attention to myself. 
37. Take time out for others. 
38. Shirk my duties. 
39. Have frequent mood swings. 
40. Use difficult words. 
41. Don’t mind being the center of attention. 
42. Feel others’ emotions. 
43. Follow a schedule. 
44. Get irritated easily. 
45. Spend time reflecting on things. 
46. Am quiet around strangers. 
47. Make people feel at ease. 
48. Am exacting in my work. 
49. Often feel blue. 
50. Am full of ideas. 
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Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how 
much you agree with it. 
 
1 ----------- 2 ----------- 3 ----------- 4 ----------- 5 ----------- 6 -----------7  
 
Not True                                 Somewhat True                              Very True  
 
1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
3. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. 
4. I have not always been honest with myself 
5. I always know why I like things. 
6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
9. I am fully in control of my own fate. 
10. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
11. I never regret my decisions. 
12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. 
13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
15. I am a completely rational person. 
16. I rarely appreciate criticism. 
17. I am very confident of my judgments. 
18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
20. I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
22. I never cover up my mistakes. 
23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
24. I never swear. 
25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
26. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. 
27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. 
30. I always declare everything at customs. 
31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
32. I have never dropped litter on the street  
33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit  
34. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
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35. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. 
36. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick. 
38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. 
39. I have some pretty awful habits. 
40. I don’t gossip about other people’s business. 
 
Creative Behavior Inventory 
 
Indicate if you have done each of the activities or accomplishments in your adolescent 
and adult life never, once or twice, 3–5 times, or more than 5 times. 
 
1. Received an award for acting 
2. Worked as an editor for a school or university literary publication 
3. Worked as an editor for a newspaper or similar organization 
4. Constructed  something that required scientific knowledge such as a radio, 
telescope, scientific apparatus, etc. (excluding school or university course work) 
5. Painted an original picture (excluding school or university course work)  
6. Entered a speech contest 
7. Designed and made your own greeting cards 
8. Gave a recital 
9. Presented an original mathematics paper to a professional or special interest group 
10. Founded a literary magazine or similar publication 
11. Made a craft out of metal (excluding school or university course work) 
12. Made candles 
13. Knitted or crocheted something (excluding school or university course work) 
14. Put on a puppet show 
15. Made your own holiday decorations 
16. Built a hanging mobile (excluding school or university course work) 
17. Received an award for performance in modern dance or ballet 
18. Received an award for performance in popular dance 
19. Had a mathematics paper published 
20. Made a sculpture (excluding school or university course work) 
21. Had original music published or publicly performed  
22. Had a piece of literature (e.g., poem, short stories, etc.) published in a school or 
university publication 
23. Developed an experimental design (excluding school or university course work) 
24. Wrote poems (excluding school or university course work) 
25. Wrote a play (excluding school or university course work) 
26. Entered a project or paper into a science contest 
27. Received an award for an artistic accomplishment 
28. Received an award for making a craft 
29. Made a craft out of plastic, plexiglass, stained glass, or a similar material 
(excluding school university course work) 
30. Made cartoons 
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31. Made a leather craft (excluding school or university course work) 
32. Made a ceramic craft (excluding school or university course work) 
33. Wrote music for one instrument (excluding school or university course work) 
34. Wrote music for several instruments (excluding school or university course work) 
35. Designed and made a piece of clothing (excluding school or university course 
work) 
36. Cooked an original dish 
37. Prepared an original floral arrangement 
38. Applied math in an original way to solve a practical problem (excluding school or 
university course work) 
39. Wrote an original computer program (excluding school or university course work) 
40. Drew a picture for aesthetic reasons (excluding school or university course work) 
41. Wrote the lyrics to a song (excluding school or university course work) 
42. Choreographed a dance (excluding school or university course work) 
43. Wrote a short story (excluding school or university course work) 
44. Wrote something humorous such as jokes, limericks, satire, etc. (excluding school 
or university course work) 
45. Planned and presented an original speech (excluding school or university course 
work) 
46. Made jewelry (excluding school or university course work) 
47. Cut a record 
48. Put on a radio show 
49. Had a piece of literature (e.g., poem, short story, etc.) published (not in a school 
or university-related publication) 
50. Took and developed your own photographs (not in a school or university-related 
publication) 
51. Performed a ballet or modern dance in a show or contest 
52. Had art work or craft work publically exhibited 
53. Won an award for musical accomplishments 
54. Wrote clever or humorous letters 
55. Designed a game 
56. Directed or organized a political group 
57. Won an award for a scientific project or paper 
58. Performed on television 
59. Assisted in the design of a set for a musical or dramatic production (excluding 
school or university work) 
60. Had art work published in a school or university publication 
61. Had a role in a dramatic production (excluding school or university work) 
62. Had art work published (excluding school or university work) 
63. Started but did not finish a novel (excluding school or university work)  
64. Wrote and completed a novel (excluding school or university work) 
65. Made or helped make a film or video tape (excluding school or university work) 
66. Made a musical instrument 
67. Helped design a float 
68. Won an award for some achievement in literature 
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69. Entered a mathematical paper or project into a contest 
70. Had a scientific paper published 
71. Planned and kept a garden 
72. Kept a sketchbook (excluding school or university work) 
73. Was a participating member of a symphony orchestra 
74. Entered a contest as a singer 
75. Entered a contest as a musician 
76. Designed and constructed a craft out of wood (excluding school or university 
work) 
77. Planned and directed a school or community event 
78. Won an award for speech and debate 
79. Wrote a play which was given in a public performance 
80. Directed or managed a dramatic production 
81. Designed and made a costume 
82. Made up magic tricks 
83. Played an instrument (percussion, including piano) with a reasonable degree of 
proficiency 
84. Played an instrument (string) with a reasonable degree of proficiency 
85. Played an instrument (brass) with a reasonable degree of proficiency 
86. Played an instrument (wind) with a reasonable degree of proficiency 
87. Participated in a drama workshop 
88. Participated in a craft workshop, club, or similar organization (excluding school 
or university work) 
89. Participated in a writers’ workshop, club, or similar organization (excluding 
school or university work) 
90. Participated in a dance workshop, club, or similar organization (excluding school 
or university work) 
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APPENDIX B 
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT 
 
Illinois State University                                                                                      Department of Psychology 
Informed Consent 
Principal Investigators:     Dr. Joel Schneider 
 
PLEASE READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY.  SIGN YOUR NAME BELOW ONLY IF 
YOU AGREE TO PARTICIPATE AND YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR RIGHTS. YOUR 
SIGNATURE IS REQUIRED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THIS RESEARCH. YOU MUST BE 18 
YEARS OF AGE TO PARTICIPATE.  IF YOU DESIRE A COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM, YOU 
MAY REQUEST ONE AND WE WILL PROVIDE IT. 
 
Description of the Study: This study will ask you to complete several surveys regarding your 
personality, how you would describe yourself, your life achievements, opinions on several topics, word 
associations, and general information about yourself. You will also be asked to evaluate situations where 
someone behaved dishonestly by creating possible explanations for the behavior. We are also interested in 
your opinion of how acceptable it would be to act dishonestly in those situations. 
 
Nature of Participation:    You will spend approximately 45 minutes to an hour completing the 
surveys and the activities. 
  
Purpose of the Study: The purpose of the study is to better understand between opinions about 
dishonest behaviors, justifications  for those behaviors, and an individual’s characteristics. 
 
Possible Risks: Overall, we do not expect any large risks based on the contents of the 
surveys.  There may be a slight risk of negative emotions when asked think about dishonest behaviors. This 
risk is not more than what you would likely encounter in your day to day life. 
 
Possible Benefits: As a possible benefit to this study, you may find the experience interesting or 
may inadvertently gain valuable self-knowledge. 
 
Compensation for your time: You will receive extra credit in a psychology course. You will 
receive extra credit simply by virtue of coming to your appointment; you are free to withdraw your 
participation at any time without penalty. 
 
Confidentiality:     Your questionnaire packet has been assigned a code number that will protect 
your identity.  All data will be kept in secured files, in accord with the standards of the University, Federal 
regulations, and the American Psychological Association. Finally, it is no individual person’s responses 
that interest us; we are studying people in general.  
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Opportunities to Question: Any technical questions about this research may be directed to Dr. 
William Joel Schneider at 438-8410.  Any questions regarding your rights as a research participant or 
research-related injuries may be directed to ISU’s Office of Research Ethics and Compliance (309) 438-
2520. 
 
Opportunities to Withdraw at Will: If you decide now or at any point to withdraw this consent 
or stop participation, you are free to do so at no penalty to yourself.  You are free to skip specific questions 
and continue participating at no penalty. 
 
Opportunities to be Informed of Results: In all likelihood, the results will be fully available 
around the May 2015. If you wish to be told the results of this research, please contact Dr. Joel Schneider 
309- 438-8410. He will either meet with you to discuss the results or direct you to a copy of the results.  In 
addition, there is a chance that the results from this study will be published in a scientific psychology 
journal, which would be available in many libraries.  In such an article, participants would be identified in 
general terms such as "college students.”   
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
I consent to participate in this study.  I further acknowledge that I have received an offer to obtain 
a copy of this consent form. 
 
 
 
Signature                                                                                                        Date     
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APPENDIX C 
 DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
 
Psychological researchers have found that people who report being more creative 
also tend to engage in higher levels of dishonest behavior. It is not yet known why this 
finding occurs. We are investigating the question as to whether creative people can 
fluently think of more reasons to be dishonest. 
 
If you would like to know the results of this study, you may contact the principal 
investigator, Joel Schneider at (309) 438-8410, or wjschne@ilstu.edu. 
 
If participating in this study has caused you discomfort, please be aware that you 
can contact the principal investigator, Joel Schneider at (309) 438-8410, or 
wjschne@ilstu.edu. You may also contact the ISU Student Counseling Services (438-
3655, in the Student Services Building) for free counseling and consultation. 
 
 
 
